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AMERICAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDICES AS SEEN
FROM A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE

KLAUS J. HOPT

†

In response to Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, The Elusive Quest
for Global Governance Standards, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1263 (2009).
1

Since the 1990s, The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins has become one of the most discussed research fields in corporate governance. Introduced in the landmark article by La Porta et al. (LLSV),
this new method of empirically measuring the economic consequences of corporate governance rules promised to give completely
new tools for research, investment, and rulemaking. As with all startups, conceptual difficulties, operational flaws, and stiff resistance by
established players arose. In the meantime, however, much was im2
proved, and the indices and metrics (leximetrics) that were developed on the basis of this empirical research gained enormous influence. Yet the criticism continued. Some criticism was inherently
concerned with how to improve the methods; other criticism was fundamental and claimed either a schism between economists and law-
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Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, supra note 1, with the early 1997 and 1998 papers by LLSV
cited therein.

(27)

28

University of Pennsylvania Law Review
PENNumbra

[Vol. 158: 27

3

yers or between America and the old continent. Of course, the latter
schism must be (1) studied against the backdrop of fundamental
methodological controversies (which are always the most bitter); (2)
seen in light of the vast divide between this new world and the old
dogmas still predominant in continental European law; and (3) understood as a reaction to the empirical results that placed AngloAmerican law in a preeminent position while disadvantaging continental Europe (and particularly France and other Roman legal or4
ders), which many considered not only wrong but unfair.
5
Against this backdrop, Bebchuk and Hamdani’s article is a great
contribution that may help to bridge the gaps mentioned. The article
may also open up a new legal and politics-of-law discourse between the
disciplines as well as between the old and new worlds. This is true for
two reasons. First, the authors reveal basic shortcomings of the leading American metrics—the corporate governance quotient, the antidirector rights index, and the anti–self dealing index—because they
neglect to account for differences in shareholder structures—
companies with (CS companies) and without (NCS companies) a controlling shareholder. Second, the attempt to empirically discover
6
economic consequences of legal origin is not denigrated; rather
Bebchuk and Hamdani emphasize improving the methodology and
using more objective criteria for the comparative evaluation of corpo7
rations and countries. While comparative law has long sought to do

3

See José M. Garrido García, Company Law and Capital Markets Law, 69 RABELS
ZEITSCHRIFT FUER AUSLAENDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 761, 766-71
(2005) (F.R.G.) (describing criticisms of the LLSV approach).
4
See generally JAN VON HEIN, DIE REZEPTION US-AMERIKANISCHEN GESELLSCHAFTSRECHTS IN DEUTSCHLAND (2008) (discussing the influence of American corporate law
on German law since World War II as well as the reasons for such influence, including
globalization, Americanization, and economic and political factors).
5
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, The Elusive Quest for Global Governance Standards, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1263 (2009).
6
See id. at 1270-71, 1306-07 (“Rather, our critique is constructive: we seek to advance the project of developing governance metrics based on objective and generally
applicable criteria, not to abandon it altogether.”).
7
See generally REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW (2d
ed. 2009) (exploring the structure of corporate law across jurisdictions); CURTIS J.
MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW AND CAPITALISM (2008) (examining the relationship between law and “market-oriented economic institutions”); Klaus J. Hopt,
Comparative Company Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 1161
(Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., rev. paperback ed. 2008) (arguing
that because corporate governance spans disciplines including corporate law and securities regulation, comparative company law is in effect the comparative study of corporate governance).
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this, its methodology has been inherently elective and subjective since
standards of good corporate governance vary considerably among
scholars, practitioners, and countries. If, however, a valid link back to
empirical data of the enterprises and financial markets can be established, this is a great step forward for research and practice. Ultimately, it fosters competition, not only among enterprises but also
among countries and their rulemakers and legislators. Such competition is the driver of progress. Insofar as competition is concerned,
Bebchuk and Hamdani are right in saying that their analysis has
“wide-ranging implications for corporate-governance research and
8
practice.”
Bebchuk and Hamdani consider mainly American literature. Yet
the index approach has had a considerable impact on the European
discussion as well. Some papers have taken a primarily critical approach; others, however, have refined it by adjusting the methodology, taking into account European and worldwide experiences, or
9
even developing new quantitative indices and methods on their own.
Greater dialogue among American scholars in both economics and
law could be fruitful for both disciplines. The following observations
on the relevance of three basic principal-agent conflicts (1) under different shareholder structures and (2) to criteria of shareholder pro-

8

Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 5, at 1268.
See, e.g., John Armour et al., How Do Legal Rules Evolve? Evidence from a CrossCountry Comparison of Shareholder, Creditor and Worker Protection, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 579
(2009) (demonstrating that civil law systems have shown substantial increases in shareholder protection over the years 1972–2005); John Armour et al., Shareholder Protection
and Stock Market Development: An Empirical Test of the Legal Origins Hypothesis, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 343 (2009) [hereinafter Armour et al., Shareholder Protection] (arguing
that common law systems protected shareholders better than civil law systems over the
years 1991–2005); Priya P. Lele & Mathias M. Siems, Shareholder Protection: A Leximetric
Approach, 7 J. CORP. L. STUD. 17 (2007) (building a shareholder protection index and
coding the development of the law for five countries over three decades); Mathias M.
Siems & Priya P. Lele, Der Schutz von Aktionären im Rechtsvergleich: Eine leximatrische und
ökonometrische Untersuchung, 173 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DAS GESAMTE HANDELSRECHT UND
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 119 (2009) (F.R.G.) (presenting two new, more accurate ways to
analyze the effect of shareholder protection: a leximetric approach, which analyzes
the development of shareholder protection laws in quantifiable terms, and an econometric approach, which analyzes the economic principles behind shareholder protection); Mathias M. Siems, Legal Origins: Reconciling Law & Finance and Comparative Law,
52 MCGILL L.J. 55 (2007) (challenging the methodology of the “legal origins” approach); Mathias M. Siems, Shareholder Protection Around the World (Leximetric II), 33 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 111 (2008) (examining the development of shareholder protection in
twenty countries over the years 1995–2005); Mathias M. Siems, What Does Not Work in
Comparing Securities Laws: A Critique on La Porta et al.’s Methodology, 16 INT’L COMPANY
& COM. L. REV. 300 (2005) (arguing that established principles of comparative law
render LLSV’s result questionable).
9
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tection under different shareholder structures should therefore be
understood as coming from a comparative European perspective and
with full respect for the demanding work of the index community.
I. THREE BASIC PRINCIPAL-AGENT CONFLICTS AND THEIR RELEVANCE
UNDER DIFFERENT SHAREHOLDER STRUCTURES
In the United States, the standard principal-agent conflict is between the shareholders and management since NCS companies seem to be
10
the rule. This is also true in the United Kingdom, though the more
frequent presence of institutional investors may be an important difference. In continental Europe, CS companies are much more com11
mon. There, the relevant principal-agent conflict is between the minority shareholders and the controlling shareholder. This conflict, known as
minority protection, has been at the center of all continental corpo12
rate legal orders since their origins in the 1840s. All group law development—represented by Germany and its Konzernrecht—is based on
this insight and necessity of protection. So, from a European perspective, emphasizing the special corporate governance problems of CS
companies as compared to NCS companies is preaching to the converted. The problems for the envisaged metrics have only begun.
Having separate scores for companies with and without control13
ling shareholders seems self-evident. But what is control ?
For a
European this is a central question, not only because of legally permissible arrangements like pyramids, dual-class shares, and other
14
mechanisms to separate cash-flow and voting rights. While in the
10

But see Clifford G. Holderness, The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States,
22 REV. FIN. STUD. 1377, 1382-85 & tbl.1 (2009) (finding that ninety-six percent of his
sample of U.S. public firms had blockholders and that they held, on average, thirtynine percent of the sample’s common stock).
11
But see infra Section II.C.
12
Cf. RIGHTS OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS: XVITH CONGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF COMPARATIVE LAW (Evanghelos Perakis ed., 2004) (presenting
general and national reports on the rights of minority shareholders).
13
Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 5, at 1271, mention the problem of “a dominant shareholder with substantial influence but not a complete lock on control” but do
not address it.
14
Id. at 1313; see also id. at 1267, 1288 n.87, 1299 (describing the impact of control
arrangements on both NCS and CS companies). The quest for one share–one vote was
pursued unsuccessfully by the European Commission. See Klaus J. Hopt, Obstacles to
Corporate Restructuring: Observations from a European and German Perspective, in PERSPECTIVES IN COMPANY LAW AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 373, 392 (Michel Tison et al. eds.,
2009) (proposing a more stringent disclosure regime for control-enhancing mechanisms).
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United States, and more specifically in Delaware, a shareholder with a
stake of fifty percent and one vote may be able to do as she pleases
with the company, this is not the case in Europe. Issues that are fundamental to the company are decided by supermajorities of two-thirds
15
of the capital present at the vote, seventy-five percent, or even more.
At the other end of the spectrum, European takeover laws provide for
a mandatory bid (i.e., early exit of minority shareholders if the bidder
takes over) if the bidder obtains between thirty percent and one-third
of the target’s votes. This broader concept of control takes account of
the low attendance rates at general meetings of public companies,
where ad hoc majorities are often reached with far less than fiftypercent control.
Quite apart from these various notions and incidences of control,
control alone may not describe the very different reality of the power
distribution in a company. This is not just a reference to the problems of how to define and deal with “acting in concert” and, more
generally, of group situations; instead, take for example the presence
of an active institutional shareholder whose incentives differ from
those of individual shareholders. The chairmen of the boards of certain European companies complain that they are called to the United
States to report to such shareholders and comply with their wishes.
But the incentives and behavior of minority shareholders also vary
considerably. In Germany, for example, there is an acute problem of
abusive minority shareholders who successfully hold up mergers and
other fundamental changes and make shareholder resolutions in or16
der to extract private benefits.
Bebchuk and Hamdani, and all three of the indices that they profile, consider only or mainly the first two principal-agent conflicts.
They disregard the principal-agent conflict between shareholders and
17
nonshareholders.
In particular, nonshareholder creditors and especially those creditors who are nearest to the company—for example,

15

See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 5, at 1299-1300, 1307 n.154 (discussing the
effects of supermajorities on governance rights). While supermajorities are certainly
helpful for shareholder protection in CS companies, id. at 1300, they can also be a useful protection device in NCS companies by granting a minimum level of protection to
the shareholders against changes by a majority that, in the case of small generalassembly presences, may often be completely accidental or even driven by special interests.
16
These maneuvers are known as “strike suits,” or Anfechtungsklagen. For examples, see the references cited by Armour et al., Shareholder Protection, supra note 9, at
353.
17
See KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 7, chs. 2.1, 4.2 (discussing agency problems and
creditor regulation).
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its employees—are not considered. Leaving creditors and creditor
protection aside is strange, not only from the perspective of European
law, under which the same protective devices often aim at minority
shareholders as well as at creditors, but more generally in failingcompany situations. While normally, the shareholders are the lenders
of last resort, the nearer a company comes to failing, the more influence creditors have, and in the end they take the place of the share18
holders as “owners” of the company. Even before the formal opening of an insolvency procedure, banks very often take the lead in NCS
companies as well as CS companies.
19
Labor is a special group of creditors. Many sociological theories
even treat them as “members” of the company. From a comparative
company law view, the principal-agent conflict between the shareholders and labor cannot be left out, certainly not for countries where
labor has an institutional presence on the board (codetermination).
Even if labor has only a minority of seats on the board—a third, as in
many European countries, or even only two seats on the board, as
most recently in France—the information flow and the opinion forming on the board changes considerably. If codetermination is at
(quasi) parity, as in Germany, the decisionmaking and power struc20
ture in the corporation is changed fundamentally. Take, for example, the issue of minority representation on the board or the issue of
independent directors, not only in the United States but also in
21
Europe. If the European recommendation of February 2005, which
22
suggests maintaining a majority of independent directors in the

18

See John Armour et al., Transactions with Creditors, in KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra
note 7, at 115-16.
19
See Beth Ahlering & Simon Deakin, Labour Regulation, Corporate Governance and
Legal Origin: A Case of Institutional Complementarity? 10-11, 37-38 (European Corporate
Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 72, 2005) (arguing that the complementarities between legal and economic institutions account for disparities across countries in
labor regulation and corporate governance).
20
As to effects of German labor codetermination, compare ELMAR GERUM, DAS
DEUTSCHE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE-SYSTEM (2007); Klaus J. Hopt, Labor Representation
on Corporate Boards: Impacts and Problems for Corporate Governance and Economic Integration
in Europe, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 203 (1994); Katharina Pistor, Corporate Governance
durch Mitbestimmung und Arbeitsmärkte, in HANDBUCH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 157
(Peter Hommelhoff et al. eds., 2003).
21
Commission Recommendation 2005/162/EC of 15 February 2005 on the Role
of Non-Executive or Supervisory Directors of Listed Companies and on the Committees of the (Supervisory) Board, Annex II, O.J. (L 52) 51, 63.
22
Independence is required not only from the board but also from the major
shareholder. See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 5, at 1302 (“In sum, when one
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three key committees (audit, nomination, and compensation), was
implemented by Germany, there would be a de facto prevalence of labor, and more specifically unions, on the board to the detriment of
the shareholders in CS companies as well as in NCS companies. In
German NCS companies, there are even examples of coalitions between management and labor against the shareholders and in CS
companies with a minority controlling shareholder (sometimes
helped by a voting cap, as in the case of Volkswagen) against the other
shareholders.
II. CRITERIA OF SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION UNDER DIFFERENT
SHAREHOLDER STRUCTURES AND BEYOND
A. NCS Companies
The list of criteria that Bebchuk and Hamdani mention as primar23
ily relevant in evaluating NCS companies —contestability of control,
shareholder voting procedures, allocation of power between the
board and shareholders, executive compensation, and director independence—is also convincing from a European perspective as far as
the relatively few NCS companies in Europe are concerned. As to the
contestability of control and the disciplinary relevance of an active
market for corporate control, I fully agree, and I join with Bebchuk in
24
being a partisan of the British-style antifrustration rule. Yet it is a
well-known fact that just looking at the market for corporate control
oversimplifies the situation. The product market, the market for directors, and other labor markets may be even more important depending on the case. Measuring one without the others may distort
the outcome. As to executive compensation, I agree that suitable procedural rules are more important than substantive norms like “rea25
sonable” remuneration or other legislative formulas. There is no iustum pretium as claimed in antiquity, and in the Middle Ages by the

evaluates the governance of CS companies, significant weight should be given to director independence from (or dependence on) the controlling shareholder.”).
23
Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 5, at 1308-09.
24
See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 973 (2002) (arguing that corporate boards should not be allowed to veto takeover bids where the shareholders favor a takeover); see also Paul Davies & Klaus Hopt, Control Transactions, in KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 225, 23338 (discussing the advantages of the “no frustration” rule).
25
See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 5, at 1309 (“The assessment could include
not only the substantive aspects of compensation arrangements but also the process for
setting executive-pay schemes . . . .”).
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scholar Thomas Aquinas, despite the present-day financial-crisis dis26
cussion and legislation. Giving shareholders a “say on pay” along the
lines of the U.K. example, however, is a useful device, though legislators in both the United Kingdom and, in July 2009, in Germany have
shied away from making it mandatory and not merely advisory.
B. CS Companies
As to the CS companies, European experience is broader than in
the United States since CS companies, belonging to a family or a
27
group (Konzern), are still predominant on the continent. Though
here, too, the list of criteria drawn up for CS companies by the au28
thors captures the principal-agent conflict surrounding minority protection both in the separate company and in the Konzern rather well,
some European observations may be of interest.
Bebchuk and Hamdani are right in stating that takeovers are most
important for NCS companies. But takeovers are not irrelevant for CS
29
companies. This is particularly true in the case of companies with a
controlling minority shareholder and more than one blockholder, as
is still normal in continental Europe. (In the United States, to the
contrary, 100 percent subsidiaries traditionally seem to prevail.) In
such cases, takeovers—hostile or at a concerted price—happen first,
and then the minority shareholders may be protected by an early-exit
30
option under the mandatory-bid rule. Contrast this with the later
exit under the squeeze-out and sell-out rules for CS companies with a
ninety to ninety-five percent controlling shareholder. The sell-out option of the minority shareholder against full compensation is clearly a

26

Id. at 1293.
Therefore, it may not be a bad idea to investigate in more depth and possibly
learn from German group law and the initiatives for building group law protection devices in the European Union. See Luca Enriques et al., Related Party Transactions, in
KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 153 (canvassing the various legal strategies to constrain related-party transactions, such as executive compensation). For the European
Union, see Klaus J. Hopt, Konzernrecht: Die europäische Perspektive, 171 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
DAS GESAMTE HANDELSRECHT UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 199 (2007) (F.R.G.) (tracking
the development of group law in Europe and discussing the benefits and difficulties of
trying to apply group law principles in other legal systems).
28
Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 5, at 1309-13.
29
See id. at 1288 & n.87 (“For the level of investor protection at CS companies,
therefore, the presence of arrangements providing protection against a hostile takeover or a proxy fight is neither good nor bad, but simply irrelevant.”).
30
See Armour et al., Shareholder Protection, supra note 9, at 355 tbl.1 (addressing the
mandatory-bid rule).
27
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protective device. Yet even the squeeze-out at the initiative of the controlling shareholder may have indirect protective effects for the
shareholders in the group: while the squeezed-out shareholders receive full compensation that they would not get in the open market,
the shareholders of the parent (including the parent’s minority
shareholder) may benefit from the positive 100-percent-steeringcontrol effect for the parent.
Voting procedures may also be relevant in special CS-company
constellations. This is especially the case for German-style bank proxy
voting. If the majority of common shareholders entrust their banks
with voting rights, and if the latter vote in the shareholders’ interest as
they are obliged by law to do, this may render control by even a major
blockholder more difficult to exercise. What is certainly true is that in
CS companies, unlike in NCS companies, giving more power to the
shareholders in relation to the board does not strengthen the (outside) shareholders—it weakens them. In this respect, the German
rule of giving the management board a normal term of five years—a
term that is much longer than those in the United States and in the
United Kingdom and that is considered to be poor corporate governance in those nations—is an attempt to strengthen the independence
of the management board vis-à-vis the supervisory board, which in
turn, apart from labor codetermination, is elected by the majority
shareholder. Independence requirements for the board or the key
committees help if they are broadly drafted to require independence
from the majority shareholder as well and if they are actually enforced.
An interesting example of differentiation between NCS and CS
31
companies is the German reform of July 2009. This disallows the
changeover from the management board into the supervisory
32
board —a good corporate governance idea and useful for NCS companies if it is not exaggerated—unless permission is given by the general assembly upon a proposal of twenty-five percent of the shareholders. It is obvious that this quorum requirement for a proposal is easy
to attain for a blockholder or in a family company but most difficult to
reach in a company with fully dispersed ownership.

31

Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung [Law on Adequate Board
Member Remuneration], July 31, 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBI. I] at 2509, art.
1, § 3(c), amending Aktiengesetz [Companies Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBI. I at 1089, §
100, para. 2, sentence 1, No. 4.
32
Similar issues include the separation of the positions of the CEO and the board
(in Germany, management and boards) and of the requirement of separate meetings
without the CEO present. Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 5, at 1303-04.
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C. Further Questions
Up to now the arguments have been that the criteria of shareholder protection under different shareholder structures could or
should still be refined. Now the unavoidable question arises: are the
shareholder structures, though of course an indispensible differentiation criterion for improving corporate governance metrics, the only or
even the major criterion of differentiation? Think of other parameters—e.g., the role of independent gatekeepers like auditors or experts
called in by the court for making special inquiries into the company’s
or the group’s affairs. Can the metrics geared just toward corporate
law catch the particularities, for example, of the traditional German
bank-oriented inside system, without looking more fully at the banks’
33
traditional panoply of influence? And if this influence shrinks drastically, as with German banks in the last decade when they sold their
blocks and retreated from supervisory boards, this movement away
34
from the traditional insider system (Rhenanian capitalism ) is much
more important for corporate law reality than many corporate law reforms of the last years possibly caught by the existing metrics. Even
more generally, how meaningful are metrics geared toward company
law alone, even if they take into consideration the shareholder structure, without evaluating the company law norms against the background of the securities-regulation regime and the financial system of
35
36
the relevant country? It is a truism that equity and debt financing
37
and company law and securities regulation are complementary, and
this complementarity may be more important than actual rules.
So is enforcement. Let me draw on the experience of the Hamburg Max Planck Institute in advising accession countries such as Bul-

33

The traditional role was fourfold: major lending, blockholding, sitting on the
board, and voting the proxies (deposit vote) of shareholders, all in the same company.
34
Cf. JEREMY EDWARDS & KLAUS FISCHER, BANKS, FINANCE AND INVESTMENT IN
GERMANY (1994) (examining Germany’s bank-based investment-finance system); THE
GERMAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM chs. 7, 15.2-15.3 ( Jan P. Krahnen & Reinhard H. Schmidt
eds., 2004) (surveying innovations in Germany’s financial architecture).
35
See, e.g., THE GERMAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 34, ch. 11.2 (discussing the
interaction between German corporate and securities law); Rafael La Porta et al., What
Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. FIN. 1 (2006) (arguing that securities laws requiring disclosure and facilitating private enforcement encourage stock-market development).
36
See Eilís Ferran, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE LAW 341-45 (2008) (exploring the relationship between equity and debt financing).
37
See generally CAPITAL MARKETS AND COMPANY LAW (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 2003) (examining the interrelationship between capital-market law and
corporate governance).
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garia, Romania, Croatia, or Serbia in adapting their corporate and
capital-market law to E.U. standards (acquis communautaire). This is
difficult enough but, in the end, is mere legal craftsmanship. Building up institutions, on the other hand, particularly a functioning court
system with independent, knowledgeable judges, is a Herculean task.
CONCLUSION
Let me end with three remarks. First, the claim made in this Response is not that all the aforementioned refinements of the legal and
factual elements that are relevant to investor protection and corporate
governance should be integrated into the governance indices, even if
they claim to be global. There is, of course, a perennial dilemma in
comparing more than two objects. The broader the comparison, the
more a reduction of complexity becomes necessary—a tightrope walk
indeed. Governance indices are bound to simplify in order to be useful yet manageable.
Second, there are many technical problems with the dual set of
metrics suggested by Bebchuk and Hamdani that are not dealt with
here. Some of them have been mentioned by the authors themselves,
38
though legitimately only in passing. To begin with, what kind of
companies should be included in the metrics? Only stock-exchangelisted corporations, or, even more generally, all stock corporations?
This may be misleading for countries like Germany with approximately one million non-stock-exchange-listed limited liability companies, many of which are as important as large stock corporations.
What shall be done with companies that may be between an NCS and
a CS company, for example, a company with the various shades of
control mentioned at the beginning of this Response? Which of the
two scores applies, for example, to the Commerzbank, which faces serious problems after taking over the Dresdner Bank and has had to
take huge federal credits, with a resulting strong dependency on the
credit-giving government bodies and ultimately public politics? This
raises not only the gray-area problem but also the problem of transition from CS to NCS company and vice versa.
This problem is multiplied if one proceeds to make comparisons
of countries and legal systems that have profoundly changed during
the last decade, as far as corporate governance, financial markets, and

38

Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 5, at 1271, 1307 (“For these companies, it
would be necessary to appropriately combine elements of the two rating systems that
we discuss below. We defer this additional task to another day . . . .”).
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enforcement are concerned. All this is technically difficult enough if
one only takes different shareholder structures into consideration.
But what if one goes further as suggested here? Having two different
scores for NCS and CS companies may still do, though this is impractical, and the desire for integrating them somehow, at least on a national level, is probably irresistible. But having half-a-dozen different
scores for shareholder structures, labor and creditor influence on the
company, securities regulation, financial markets, enforcement, and
so on is less than satisfactory.
Third, in all modern industrialized countries, the importance of
financing at the equity markets and consequently changing from a
mere CS company to a mixed one is quickly growing. On the other
hand, in countries that traditionally have only had NCS companies,
the rise of institutional shareholders and of private equity holding by
forming groups of companies and by granting lavish stock options to
board members and senior officers is important. While it is true that
there are still major differences as to the prevailing shareholder structures in the United States and the United Kingdom on the one hand
and continental Europe on the other, the trend toward convergence
may make the quest for global standards less elusive than the authors
believe today. In any case, whatever future metrics will look like, it
should never be forgotten that they are only one instrument among
others and that basing comparative, investment, and even policy decisions on them alone would be misleading indeed. Bebchuk and
Hamdani’s excellent article reminds us of this.
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